2047

作者：英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)

2008年2月22日 星期五

艾伦•格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)在《动荡年代》(The Age of Turbulence)里写道：“我将告诉人们，我们面临的不是一个泡沫而是一团泡沫——许多局部的小泡沫，它们永远不会发展到足以威胁整体经济健康的规模。” 这曾经是格林斯潘对美国房地产泡沫的看法。可惜，他错了。那么这种低迷能有多严重呢？要回答这个问题，我们应当请教一位真正的悲观人士。我最喜欢的一位是纽约大学斯特恩商学院(New York University's Stern School of Business)的教授鲁里埃尔•鲁比尼(Nouriel Roubini)，他是RGE monitor的创始人。 最近，鲁比尼教授对美国经济的假设令人不寒而栗。但他的想法值得我们认真对待。2006年7月，他率先预测了美国的衰退*。当时，他的观点极具争议。如今已经不再是这样了。现在他声称，“产生‘灾难性'金融和经济后果的可能性不断加大” **。他提出，这一假设的特点是“恶性循环，即深度衰退导致金融亏损更为严重，反过来，不断加剧的大规模金融亏损和金融崩溃又会令衰退更为严重。”

I would tell audiences that we were facing not a bubble but a froth – lots of small, local bubbles that never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall economy.” Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence.

That used to be Mr Greenspan's view of the US housing bubble. He was wrong, alas. So how bad might this downturn get? To answer this question we should ask a true bear. My favourite one is Nouriel Roubini of New York University's Stern School of Business, founder of RGE monitor.

Recently, Professor Roubini's scenarios have been dire enough to make the flesh creep. But his thinking deserves to be taken seriously. He first predicted a US recession in July 2006*. At that time, his view was extremely controversial. It is so no longer. Now he states that there is “a rising probability of a ‘catastrophic' financial and economic outcome”**. The characteristics of this scenario are, he argues: “A vicious circle where a deep recession makes the financial losses more severe and where, in turn, large and growing financial losses and a financial meltdown make the recession even more severe.”

Prof Roubini is even fonder of lists than I am. Here are his 12 – yes, 12 – steps to financial disaster.

Step one is the worst housing recession in US history. House prices will, he says, fall by 20 to 30 per cent from their peak, which would wipe out between $4,000bn and $6,000bn in household wealth. Ten million households will end up with negative equity and so with a huge incentive to put the house keys in the post and depart for greener fields. Many more home-builders will be bankrupted.

Step two would be further losses, beyond the $250bn-$300bn now estimated, for subprime mortgages. About 60 per cent of all mortgage origination between 2005 and 2007 had “reckless or toxic features”, argues Prof Roubini. Goldman Sachs estimates mortgage losses at $400bn. But if home prices fell by more than 20 per cent, losses would be bigger. That would further impair the banks' ability to offer credit.

Step three would be big losses on unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans, student loans and so forth. The “credit crunch” would then spread from mortgages to a wide range of consumer credit.

Step four would be the downgrading of the monoline insurers, which do not deserve the AAA rating on which their business depends. A further $150bn writedown of asset-backed securities would then ensue.

Step five would be the meltdown of the commercial property market, while step six would be bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank.

Step seven would be big losses on reckless leveraged buy-outs. Hundreds of billions of dollars of such loans are now stuck on the balance sheets of financial institutions.

Step eight would be a wave of corporate defaults. On average, US companies are in decent shape, but a “fat tail” of companies has low profitability and heavy debt. Such defaults would spread losses in “credit default swaps”, which insure such debt. The losses could be $250bn. Some insurers might go bankrupt.

Step nine would be a meltdown in the “shadow financial system”. Dealing with the distress of hedge funds, special investment vehicles and so forth will be made more difficult by the fact that they have no direct access to lending from central banks.

Step 10 would be a further collapse in stock prices. Failures of hedge funds, margin calls and shorting could lead to cascading falls in prices.

Step 11 would be a drying-up of liquidity in a range of financial markets, including interbank and money markets. Behind this would be a jump in concerns about solvency.

Step 12 would be “a vicious circle of losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation and
fire sales of assets at below fundamental prices”.

These, then, are 12 steps to meltdown. In all, argues Prof Roubini: “Total losses in the financial system will add up to more than $1,000bn and the economic recession will become deeper more protracted and severe.” This, he suggests, is the “nightmare scenario” keeping Ben Bernanke and colleagues at the US Federal Reserve awake. It explains why, having failed to appreciate the dangers for so long, the Fed has lowered rates by 200 basis points this year. This is insurance against a financial meltdown.

Is this kind of scenario at least plausible? It is. Furthermore, we can be confident that it would, if it came to pass, end all stories about “decoupling”. If it lasts six quarters, as Prof Roubini warns, offsetting policy action in the rest of the world would be too little, too late.

Can the Fed head this danger off? In a subsequent piece, Prof Roubini gives eight reasons why it cannot***. (He really loves lists!) These are, in brief: US monetary easing is constrained by risks to the dollar and inflation; aggressive easing deals only with illiquidity, not insolvency; the monoline insurers will lose their credit ratings, with dire consequences; overall losses will be too large for sovereign wealth funds to deal with; public intervention is too small to stabilise housing losses; the Fed cannot address the problems of the shadow financial system; regulators cannot find a good middle way between transparency over losses and regulatory forbearance, both of which are needed; and, finally, the transactions-oriented financial system is itself in deep crisis.

The risks are indeed high and the ability of the authorities to deal with them more limited than most people hope. This is not to suggest that there are no ways out. Unfortunately, they are poisonous ones. In the last resort, governments resolve financial crises. This is an iron law. Rescues can occur via overt government assumption of bad debt, inflation, or both. Japan chose the first, much to the distaste of its ministry of finance. But Japan is a creditor country whose savers have complete confidence in the solvency of their government. The US, however, is a debtor. It must keep the trust of foreigners. Should it fail to do so, the inflationary solution becomes probable. This is quite enough to explain why gold costs $920 an ounce.

The connection between the bursting of the housing bubble and the fragility of the financial system has created huge dangers, for the US and the rest of the world. The US public sector is now coming to the rescue, led by the Fed. In the end, they will succeed. But the journey is likely to be wretchedly uncomfortable.

*A Coming Recession in the US Economy? July 17 2006, www.rgemonitor.com; **The Rising Risk of a Systemic Financial Meltdown, February 5 2008; ***Can the Fed and Policy Makers Avoid a Systemic Financial Meltdown? Most Likely Not, February 8 2008

     英国最著名的古典音乐唱片评论杂志《留声机》近来发起了一次评选有史以来最伟大的十张古典音乐唱片的活动,广大《留声机》的乐迷踊跃参加,通过信件、Ｅ—Ｍａｉｌ投票,第一轮已产生了75张唱片。第二轮投票评选也正在进行之中(有兴趣者可访问其站点并投票)。最终的十大唱片将在这75张中产生。这75张唱片无一例外,都是古典音乐的经典名盘,广受乐迷欢迎的大热门,也是唱片公司历年来不断再版的摇钱树。

     最近ＥＭＩ推出的“世纪伟大录音”系列里,就有克伦佩勒指挥的“德语安魂曲”、福特文格勒指挥的贝多芬“第九交响曲”、里帕第弹奏的肖邦圆舞曲、梅纽因演奏的艾尔加小提琴协奏曲、施瓦茨科普夫演唱的“最后四首歌”、里赫特演奏的舒伯特“流浪者幻想曲”等;ＤＧ的“大师原版”系列中则有库贝利克指挥的德沃夏克“第八交响曲”、福特文格勒指挥的舒伯特“第九交响曲”、小克莱伯指挥的贝多芬“第五和第七交响曲”、里赫特演奏的拉赫马尼诺夫“第二钢琴协奏曲”等,市面上都不难找到。

     现将这份75张伟大唱片的名单译出如下,供乐迷购片时参考。身为古典音乐爱好者,这些可都是不容错过的极品啊!很多乐迷面对琳琅满目的唱片市场不知从何入手,其实,参考这张“名盘榜单”倒不失为一条捷径。

1.巴赫:圣诞清唱剧(门赫因格指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
2.巴赫:歌德堡变奏曲(古尔德演奏1981年版,ＳＯＮＹ出品)
3.巴赫:马太受难曲(克伦佩勒指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
4.巴赫:独奏大提琴组曲(卡萨尔斯演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
5.巴托克:乐队协奏曲(雷纳指挥,ＲＣＡ出品)
6.贝多芬:歌剧“费德里奥”(克伦佩勒指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
7.贝多芬:晚期钢琴奏鸣曲(所罗门演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
8.贝多芬:晚期弦乐四重奏(布希四重奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
9.贝多芬:第四钢琴协奏曲(肯普夫演奏,莱特纳指挥,ＤＧ出品)
10.贝多芬:钢琴奏鸣曲集(施纳贝尔演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
11.贝多芬:第三交响曲(克伦佩勒指挥1955年版,ＥＭＩ出品)
12.贝多芬:第九交响曲(福特文格勒指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
13.贝多芬:第五、第七交响曲(克莱伯指挥,ＤＧ出品)
14.贝利尼:歌剧:“诺尔玛”(塞拉芬指挥1954版,卡拉丝演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
15.柏辽兹:歌剧“特洛伊人”(戴维斯指挥,Ｐｈｉｌｉｐｓ出品)
16.比才:卡门(比彻姆指挥,洛斯安赫莱斯、盖达等演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
17.勃拉姆斯:德语安魂曲(克伦佩勒指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
18.勃拉姆斯:钢琴协奏曲两首(吉列尔斯演奏,约胡姆指挥,ＤＧ出品)
19.勃拉姆斯:第四交响曲(小克莱伯指挥,ＤＧ出品)
20.布里顿:彼得-格莱姆斯(布里顿指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
21.布里顿:战争安魂曲(布里顿指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
22.布鲁克纳:第八交响曲(卡拉扬指挥1988年版,ＤＧ出品)
23.肖邦:钢琴练习曲(波利尼演奏,ＤＧ出品)
24.肖邦:圆舞曲(里帕第演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
25.德彪西:大海(卡拉扬1964年版,ＤＧ出品)
26.德彪西:钢琴独奏作品(吉塞金演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
27.德留斯:乐队作品(比彻姆指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
28.德沃夏克:第八交响曲(库贝利克指挥,ＤＧ出品)
29.德沃夏克:大提琴协奏曲(罗斯特洛波维奇演奏,卡拉扬指挥,ＤＧ出品)
30.艾尔加:杰隆提斯之梦(萨金特指挥,Ｔｅｓｔａｍｅｎｔ出品
31.艾尔加:大提琴协奏曲,海景(杜普雷演奏,贝克演唱,巴比罗利指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
32.艾尔加:小提琴协奏曲(梅纽因演奏,艾尔加指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
33.沃恩-威廉姆斯:弦乐作品(巴比罗利指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
34.亨德尔:弥赛亚(比彻姆指挥皇家爱乐乐团1959年版,ＲＣＡ出品)
35.亨德尔:水上音乐(库贝利克指挥,ＤＧ出品)
36.海顿:交响曲集(多拉蒂指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
37.希尔德加德:上帝呼吸中的一片羽毛(歌特之声合唱团,Ｈｙｐｅｒｉｏｎ出品)
38.李斯特:前奏曲(卡拉扬指挥,ＤＧ出品)
39.李斯特:钢琴协奏曲两首(里赫特演奏,康德拉辛指挥伦敦交响乐团,Ｐｈｉｌｉｐｓ出品)
40.马勒:大地之歌(瓦尔特指挥维也纳爱乐乐团,费里尔及帕扎克演唱,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
41.马勒:第二交响曲(拉特尔指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
42.马勒:第八交响曲(索尔第指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
43.马勒:第九交响曲(卡拉扬指挥1982年现场版,ＤＧ出品)
44.莫扎特:歌剧“女人心”(伯姆指挥爱乐乐团,施瓦茨科普夫等演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
45.莫扎特:歌剧“唐潢”(朱里尼指挥爱乐乐团,施瓦茨科普夫及萨瑟兰演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
46.莫扎特:圆号协奏曲四首(布莱恩演奏,卡拉扬指挥爱乐乐团,ＥＭＩ出品)
47.莫扎特:歌剧“费加罗的婚礼”(老克来伯指挥维也纳爱乐乐团,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
48.莫扎特:歌剧“魔笛”(比彻姆指挥柏林爱乐乐团,Ｐｅａｒ1、Ｎｉｍｂｕｓ、ＥＭＩ均有出品)
49.普契尼:歌剧“艺术家的生涯”(比彻姆指挥,比约林等演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
50.普契尼:歌剧“托斯卡”(卡拉丝演唱,德萨巴塔指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
51.拉赫马尼诺夫:第二钢琴协奏曲(里赫特演奏,ＤＧ出品)
52.拉赫马尼诺夫:第二交响曲(普列文指挥1972年版,ＥＭＩ出品)
53.拉赫马尼诺夫、拉威尔:钢琴协奏曲(米凯兰杰利演奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
54.拉威尔:达夫尼和克罗(蒙特指挥伦敦交响乐团,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
55.勋伯格:升华之夜;舒伯特;弦乐五重奏(好莱坞四重奏,Ｔｅｓｔａｍｅｎｔ出品)
56.舒伯特:艺术歌曲集(费歇尔-迪斯高演唱,摩尔钢琴伴奏,ＤＧ出品)
57.舒伯特:第九交响曲(福特文格勒指挥1951年版,ＤＧ出品)
58.舒伯特:流浪者幻想曲(里赫特钢琴独奏,ＥＭＩ出品)
59.舒曼:第四交响曲(福特文格勒指挥1951年版,ＤＧ出品)
60.西贝柳斯:小提琴协奏曲(海菲茨演奏,比彻姆指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
61.斯美塔纳:我的祖国(库贝利克指挥捷克爱乐乐团1990年版,Ｓｕｐｒａｐｈｏｎ出品) 62里查-斯特
劳斯:歌剧“埃莱克特拉”(索尔第指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
63.里查-斯特劳斯:最后四首歌(施瓦茨科普夫演唱,塞尔指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
64.里查-斯特劳斯:歌剧“玫瑰骑士”(卡拉扬指挥1956年版,ＥＭＩ出品)
65.柴可夫斯基:第一钢琴协奏曲(霍罗维兹演奏,托斯卡尼尼指挥1941年版,ＲＣＡ出品)
66.柴可夫斯基:第四到第六交响曲(穆拉文斯基指挥1961年版,ＤＧ出品)
67.女高音的艺术(萨瑟兰演唱,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
68.威尔第:歌剧“法斯塔夫”(托斯卡尼尼指挥,ＲＣＡ出品)
69.威尔第:歌剧“奥塞罗”(托斯卡尼尼指挥,ＲＣＡ出品)
70.威尔第:安魂曲(托斯卡尼尼指挥,ＲＣＡ出品)
71.威尔第:歌剧“茶花女”(吉奥指挥,卡拉丝1958年演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)
72.瓦格纳:歌剧“帕西法尔”克纳佩茨布希指挥1962年版,Ｐｈｉｌｉｐｓ出品)
73.瓦格纳:歌剧“指环”(索尔第指挥,Ｄｅｃｃａ出品)
74.瓦格纳:歌剧“特利斯坦和伊索尔达”(福特文格勒指挥,ＥＭＩ出品)
75.瓦格纳:歌剧“女武神”第一幕(瓦尔特指挥维也纳爱乐乐团,勒曼等演唱,ＥＭＩ出品)

     稍做一番统计,不难发觉以下事实:75张唱片中,有7张为卡拉扬指挥,5张为英国指挥家比彻姆指挥,4张托斯卡尼尼指挥,福特文格勒、克伦佩勒、索尔第、库贝利克各三张,瓦尔特两张、巴比罗利两张。钢琴家里赫特的唱片有三张,女高音卡拉丝也有三张唱片。再数数唱片公司,历史最悠久的ＥＭＩ占了33张,ＤＧ占了17张,这两家老牌唱片公司加起来竟占去75张名盘的三分之二份额!成立于40年代的Ｄｅｃｃａ有11张上榜,名列第三,算是最可畏的后生。在75张唱片中,有28张系单声道时期录制的老唱片(下加划线),占了37%。这很能说明问题。看来,尽管新唱片层出不穷,新秀多得令人眼花缭乱,几十年前前辈大师们录制的经典老唱片仍在乐迷心中占有难以取代的重要地位。余下的名盘也多是五六十年代的老东西,很明显,真正新的东西实在不多,其中值得注意的是1990年库贝利克现场录制的“我的祖国”,这是75张唱片中最新的录音。英国Ｈｙｐｅｒｉｏｎ公司以一张合唱唱片上榜,成为众多新唱片公司中唯一有唱片入榜的一个。应当指出,这份清单远不能包容所有的古典音乐名盘。比如,肖邦作品的精彩唱片极多,堪称名盘的至少有几十张,这里只有两张:波利尼演奏的练习曲和里帕第演奏的圆舞曲。当然,这两张确实是名盘,但千万不要以为它们就是最上乘的肖邦唱片了。它们只不过是最受大众欢迎、得票最多的而已。

她贴近我的心，就像花草贴紧大地；她对我说来是如此甜蜜，犹如睡眠之子疲惫的
肢体；我对她的爱就是我的整个生命的泛滥，似秋日上涨的河水，无声地纵情奔流；我
的歌和我的爱是一体，就像溪流的潺潺涟漪，以它的波浪和水流歌唱。

当我不理解你信号的内涵时，一不小心也能把它遮掩。
既然我如今已比以往聪明，我透过以前的屏障，顿悟了它的全部寓意。
它绘在鲜花的花瓣上；大海使它闪烁；群山将它捧上峰巅。
我曾转过脸去，把你避开，因而曲解了你的意思，不知其中的含义。